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NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS

CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW -

MARRIAGES -

LAWS

PROHIBITING

RACIAL

INTERMARRIAGE. Mandamus proceedings were brought by a White female
and Negro male in the California Supreme Court to compel issuance of
registry certificate and marriage license by county clerk. Said county
clerk invoked Sec.. 69 of the Cal. Civ. Code which specifies ".. . no license
may be issued authorizing the marriage of a white person with a Negro,"
etc. The code further expressly declares such miscegenous marriages to
be illegal and void. Cal. Civ. Code, Sec. 60 (Deering 1941). The court in
a four to three decision, two .of the majority strongly concurring, held
that the writ should issue and that Secs. 60 and 69 of the Cal. Civ. Code
are unconstitutional, for in "restricting the individual's right to marry
on the basis of race alone, they violate the equal protection of the laws
clause of the United States Constitution." In addition the majority found
the statutes too vague and indefinite in their failure to define the term
Negro. Perez et al. v. Lippold, 198 P. 2d 17 (Cal. 1948). Rehearing denied
Oct. 28, 1948.
The prohibition of Negro-White intermarriage is statutory, no such
prohibition existing at Common Law. Hart v. Hose, 26 La. Ann. 90
(1874); MADDEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 38 (1931); 1 SCHOULER, MARRIAGE,
DIvoRcE, SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 24 (6th ed. 1921) ; 32 Cal.
L. Rev. 269 (1944). However, today the majority of states have statutes
forbidding Negro-White marriages. Ala. Code, tit. 14, Secs. 360-361
(1940), Ala. Const. Sec. 102; Ariz. Code Ann., c. 63, see. 107 (1939),
amended Sess. Laws, c. 12 (1942) ; Ark. Stat., tit. 55, sees. 104-105 (1947) ;
Colo. Stat. Ann., c. 107, secs. 2, 3 (1935); Del. Rev. Code, c. 85, sec. 1
(1935); Fla. Ann. Stat. secs. 741.11- .12 (1944), Fla. Const. Art. XVI,
sec. 24; Ga. Code Ann. sees. 53-106, 53-9902-03 (1937); Idaho Code sec.
32-206 (1947); Ind. Stat. Ann. sec. 44-104 (1933); Ky Rev. Stat. sec.
402.020 (1946); La. Civ. Code art. 94 (1945); Myd. Code Ann., art. 27,
sec. 445 (1939); Miss. Code Ann. sec. 459 (1942), Miss. Const. sec. 5700
Mo. Rev. Stat. sees. 3361, 4651 (1942); Mont. Rev. Code Ann, sec. 5700
(1945); Neb. Rev. Stat. sec. 42-103 (1943); Nev. Comp. Laws sees.
10197-98 (1929); N. Car. Gen. Stat. sec. 51(1943), N. Car. Const.
Art. XIV, sec. 8; N. D. Rev. Code sec. 14-0304 (1943); Old. Stat. tit. 43
(1941); Ore. Comp. Laws see. 63-102 (1940); S. Car. Code sec. 8571
(1942), S. Car. Const. Art. III, sec. 33; S. D. Code see. 14.0106, subd
(1939). Tenn. Code sec. 8409 (1938), Tenn. Const. Art. XI, sec. 14;
Tex. Stat. art. 4607 (1949); Utah Code secs. 40, 41, 42 (5, 6) (1943);
Va. Code Ann. sec. 5087 (1942); W. Va. Code Ann. see. 4701 (1943);
Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. se. 50-108 (1945).
Much respectable authority, in accord with the principal case, maintains that these laws are without scientific basis, KoEBRER, ANTHROPOLOGY
205 (1948); REUTER, THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM 95 (1927); 58 Yale
L J. 472 (1949) ; 36 Yale L. J. 858 (1927) ; 22 Cal. L. Rev. 116 (1934), but
instead are the result of prejudice and the desire to maintain White
socio-economic superiority. 1 VERNER=, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS, sec. 44
(1931). Despite these criticisms, prior reported decisions have uniformly
held that these restraining statutes are valid regulations enacted by
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the state within its power to prescribe who may marry. Stevens v. United
States, 146 F. 2d 120 (C. C. A. 10th 1944); Ex parte Francois,9 Fed CaB.
699, No. 5,047 (C. C. W. D. Tex. 1879); In re Hobbs, 12 Fed. Cas. 262,
No. 6,550 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1871); MADDEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 5 (1931);
32 Calif. L. Rev. 269 (1944). The instant case illustrates a change in the
law, for prior decisions have also uniformly held that these statutes do
not deny equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. State v. Tutty, 41 F. 753,7 L. R. A. 50 (C. C. S. D. Ga. 1890);
Ex parts Kinney, 14 Fed. Cas. 602, No. 7, 825, 3 Hughes 9 (C. C. E. D.
Va. 1879); In re Hobbs, 12 Fed. Cas. 262, No. 6, 550 (C. C. N. D. Ga.
(1871); RODGERS, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 49 (1899). The basis for these
prior .holdings is that both racial groups are equally prohibited from
intermarrying and thereby receive equal treatment of the laws. Pace v.
Ala., 10 U. S.583 (1882); State v. Hairston,63 N. C. 439 (1869); State
v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 50 Am. Rep. 499 (1883); 20 So. Cal. L. Rev. 80
(1946). However, these decisions have overlooked the fact brought out
in the principal case that the right to marry is individual, that marriage is
one of the basic civil rights of man," Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535 (1936) ;
6 UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

BULLETIN 6, Art. 16 (1949),

and that the Fourteenth Amendment was especially designed to protect
individual rights. McCabe v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe, 235 U. S. 151
(1914).; State of Mo. ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, Reg. of Mo. Univ., 305
U. S. 337 (1938). The impairment of individual rights on the basis or
race alone has been expressly declared to constitute a denial of equal
protection of the laws, Hurabyaskiv. United States, 320 U. S.81 (1943);
Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400 (1942) ; Yu Cong Eng. v. Trinidad, 271 U. S.
500 (1926); McCabe v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe, 235 U.S. 151
(1914); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886), and to be "odious
to a free people." Hurabyashi*v.United States, 320 U. S. 81 (1943).
Aside from the technical question of equal protection of the laws, the
critics of anti-miscegenation laws add to their potent argument by pointing out that historically the Fourteenth Amendment "was adopted to
prevent state legislation designed to perpetuate discrimination on the
basis of race or color," Railway Mail Assn. v.Corsi,326 U. S.88 (1945),
and to place the colored race in respect to civil rights upon a level with
the White race. Ez parte Virginia, 100 U. S.313 (1879). The framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment were primarily concerned, as stated by Chief
Justice Vinson in a recent opinion, with the "establishment of equality in
the enjoyment of basic civil and political rights and the preservation of
those rights from discriminatory action on the part af the states based
on considerations of race or color." Shelley v. Kraemr, 334 U. S. 1
(1947) ; Strauder v. W. Va., 100 U. S.303 (1880) ; See also the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1880).
North Dakota has substantially the same statutory prohibition as
California, N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 14-0304, except that the term
Negro is defined in Sec. 14-0305. North Dakota, with Negroes comprising
only.03% of its total population, Vol. II, part 3, 16th Census of the
United States (1940) page 426, has no reported case on miscegenation,
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but the influence of the instant case casts doubt on the constitutionality
of all anti-miscegenation laws.
DAvID R. LowaL.L

"SftOND YEAR LAW STUDENT.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEPARTIN OF CHURCH AND STATE - FmsT
AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION -. RELIGIOUS CLASSES. IN
PUBLIC ScHOOLS. A program was instituted by the local school board of
Champaigne, Illinois, whereby pupils compelled by the state compulsory
educational system to attend school for secular education, were released
temporarily from secular study on condition that they attend religious
classes conducted in the public school classrooms by religious teachers
from the various denominations. Petitioner, self-acclaimed atheist, applied to the Circuit Court of Champaigne County for a Writ of Mandamus to compel the Board-of Education to enforce regulations prohibiting
all instruction in and teaching of-religious education in all public schools
and buildings under its jurisdiction. The petition was denied and on
appeal .to the Supreme Court of Illinois, it was held, that the judgmentdismissing the petition be affirmed. This ruling was upheld under the
State Constitution which. provided, "nor shall any preference be given
by law to any religious denomination or mode of worship," Art. Il, See. 5,
the Court considering that a reasonable interpretation of the. Federal and
State Constitutions would not render voluntary religious classes unconstitutional, the Court directing attention to the fact that the classes
were voluntary by consent of the children's parents, conducted without
expense to the school board, and did not interfere with regular education.
On appeal to -the Supreme Court of the United States, it was held, that
the decision be reversed,, on the ground that the system involved a utilization of tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid
religious groups to spread their religious faith, thus violating the es .
tablishment of religion clause of the First Amendment made applicable
to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. People ez. tel McCollum v.
Board of Education of School District No. 71, 383 U. S. 203, 68'S. Ct. 461,
92 L. Ed. 649 (1948).
" This decision casts a shadow on the legality of the secular-religious
systems that are integrated into many school programs in the United
States. The decision is based almost entirely on the principle set forth
in the free-bus transportation for parochial school children case, Everson
v. Board of Educationof th 'Townkhip of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1,67 S. Ct. 504
91 L. E. 711 (1947) where it was held, that free-bus transportation provided for by law in New Jersey for parochial school children was constitutonal and did not violate the 14th Amendment, being a furtherance
of public purpose, the court dividing in a 5-4 decision. Here the foundation for the McCollum Case was laid. Mr. Justice Black stated, "Neither
a state nor the Federal government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another." The McCollum Case is the latest Supreme Court interpretation
of the First Amendment which states, "Congress shall make no law
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respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof." The Supreme Court delved deeply into the historical baekground
surrounding the adoption bf this Amendment, depending much on the
"wall of separation" theory advocated by Thomas Jefferson, and practically turning a,nere figure of speech into a rule of law. The dissent
in the McCollum Case noted that Jefferson himself did not exclude religious education from the University of Virginia, an institution that he
founded. I Corpus Juris 941, note 46; The Wr 4tings of Thomas Jefferson,
Memorial Edition, 449, (1904). James Madison primarily proposed the
First Amendment as it now stands, Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U S.145, 63 S.
Ct. 893, 25 L. Ed. 244 (1878).
The Supreme Court has applied the First Amendment to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Murdock v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 63 S. Ct. 870, 87 °L.Ed. 1292 (1943). Mr.
Justice Roberts has recently stated, "The fundamental concept of liberty
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First AmendmenL" Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296,
303, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 987 (1940). The Amendment has been explained as meaning that nothing inimical to religion is intended. Holy
Trinity Church v. U. S., 143 U. S. 457, 12"S. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226 (1892).
It has also been held that no parent has the right to demand that the
intereits of the children should be sacrificed for the interest of his child.
Trustees of Schools v.People ex. rel. Allen, 87 IMI. 303: (1887). A Supreme
Court case held that it was unconstitutional for a state to force children by
law to accept public school instruction only. Pierce v. Society of Sistors,
268 U. S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 9 L. Ed. 1070 (1925). Throughout the history
of the nation this issue has been presented again and again to the Supreme
Court for its answer as to the true meaning of establishment of religion.
This new vfew oint of the court in the McCollum Case opens the path for
much litigation on the "released time" programs existing in America.
One commentator questions the power of the Supreme Court on this
subject and queries as to whether or not the Supreme Court has usurped
the power of the state courts in the interpretation of state laws regarding
the establishment of religion. Owen, The McCollum Case, 22 Temple Law
Quarterly 159 (1948). In Brunwick-Balke-Collander.Co. v.. Evans, 228
Fed. 991 (i916) the court referred to this issue as a matter to be left
exclusively to the state constitution and laws enacted in pursuance
thereof. This was the holding of the Supreme Court before passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Permoli v. New Orleans,44 U.S. 589, 11 L.
Ed. 7139 (1845). In New York and Illinois it has been held that pupils
attending public schools may be excused for the purpose of attending
religious education classes in their own churches, no use of public
school classrooms being made. People ex. rel. Lewis v. Graves, 245 N.Y.
195,.156 N.E. 663 (1927); People ex. rel. Latimer et. al. v. Board of
Education of City of Chicago, 394 Ill..
228, 68 N.E. 2d. 305 (1946). The
"child benefit" theory of filling a public need and serving a public purpose where "intidental benefit to the private 'institution is immaterial,
the prime benefactors being the children" Board of Education of Baltimore County v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 199 A. 628 (1948), was applied
to upholding free bus transportation of pupils other than those attend-

NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS
ing public schools, following Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 655, 191 S. W.
2d 930 (1945) and Adams v. St. Mary's County, 26 A. 2d 377 (Md. 1942).
This theory has been applied in bringing the supplying of free textbooks
to pupils enrolled in private schools within constitutional limits, Borden
et. al. vr.
Louisiana State Board of Education, 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655
(1929) and on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States it was
held that the judgment be affirmed. Cochrane et. al. v. Louisiana State
Board of Education, 281 U. S. 374, 5. S.Ct. 335, 74 L. Ed. 913 (1930).
For a discussion that this type of aid is merely assistance to the children
in their compliance with the compulsory laws of their states, see 16
N. Y. L. Quarterly Review 142 (1938-39) and 22 Notre Dame Lawyer
192 (194647). This doctrine of benefit to the child* was recognized in
Chance v.- Mississippi State Textbook R. and P. Board, 190 Miss. 453,
200.So. 706 (1940) where the textbooks were regarded as a "loan" to the
children and remained the state's property and could therefore be used by
pupils in private as well' as secular schools. However, the rule will not
be applied to tuition fees, People v.Board of Education, .13 Barb. 400,
N.Y. (1851); Otken v. Lankin, 56 Miss. 758 (1879). In Quick Bear v.
Leupp, 210 U. S. 50, 28 S. Ct. 690, 52 L. Ed. 954 (1909), the Supreme
Court of the United States allowed money appropriated by Congress for
the use of Indians to be used in support of Indian denominational
schools, where a contract' between the Indian Commissioner and the
schools existed. Contra to the above doctrine is Smith v. Donahue, 195
N. Y. S. 715,- 202 App. Div. 656 (1922) where it was held that a parochial school might not receive the benefit of use of public textbooks,
and in Judd v.Board of Education, 278 N. Y. 200, 15 N. E. 2d 576 (1938)
free bus transportation was held unconstitutional, but later the New
York State Constitution was changed so as to permit free bus transportation for all school children. Nuns employed as teachers in the
public schools of North Dakota, were upheld in their constitutional right
to give a portion of their earnings to the religious group that they represent and to wear distinctive religious garb in Gerhardtv.Heid, 66 N. D.
444, 267 N. W. 127, (1936). However in 1948, an initiated measure was
approved by the electorate banning religious dress in North Dakota
schools. And in the latest case to come before the state courts on the
issue of released time, the New York plan for release of public school
pupils from regular attendance for the purpose of religious instruction,
has successfully met its first test of unconstitutionality in Lewis v.
Spaulding, 85 N. Y. S. 2d 682, (1949).
So it now appears that even though the State and Federal Supreme
Courts look at the question from a different viewpoint, the Supreme
Court is now well on the road to maintaining the wall of separation "high
and impregnable," as set forth by Justice Black. It would seem that the
Supreme Court will now be faced with an increased amount of litigation
involving its new construction of the "establishment" clause of the First
Amendment and the position in which it places the state courts in interpreting their respective constitutions.
EDWARD M. PETERSON
SECOND YwE

LAw STUDENT

CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL LAw - EVIDENCE - COMPULSORY UTTERANCE FOR PURPOSE
OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION AS VIOLATING THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION. - The accused, a negro, while in a police lineup with
other negroes was compelled to repeat certain words which the prosecutrix had previously stated were used by the person who assaulted her.
The defendapt was convicted. On appeal it was held that the conviction
be reversed and a new trial granted. The supreme court of South Carolina concluded that the testimony as to identity of the accused based on
the forced repetition, prior to trial, by accused of words alleged to have
been used at the scene of the crime was inadmissible as violating the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Taylor, 49
S. E. 2d 289 (S. C. 1948).
The privilege against self-incrimination is embodied in the constitutions of all but two states, Iowa and New Jersey. In these two it is part of
the common law. Section 13 of the North Dakota Constitution provides
that, "No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." N. D. Rev. Cede (1943), Sec. 31-0109 provides
that, "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself in
a criminal action." The provisions against self-incrimination are generally considered to be a limitation upon testimonial compulsion directed
against the defendant as a witness, that is, compelling the defendant himself to say or do something which has a tendency to incriminate him.
The essence of the privilege is freedom from testimonial compulsion. The
courts have recognized and made a distinction between self-incrimination, State vi. Griffin, 129 S. C. 200, 124 S. E. 81, 82, 35 A. L. R. 1227
(1924) and compulsory submission to treatment which furnishes evidence for the purpose of the identification of an accused. O'Brien v.
State, 125 Ind. 38, 25 N.E. 137, 9 L. R. A. 323 (1890). Wigmore states,
"An inspection of the bodily features by the tribunal or by witnesses
cannot violate the privilege because it does not call upon the accused
as a witness, i. e. upon his testimonial responsibilities. That he may, in
such cases, be required to exercise muscular action ... is immaterial unless all bodily action were synonymous with testimonial utterance; for
not compulsion alone is the component idea of the privilege but testimonial compulsion. What is obtained from the accused by such action
is not testimony about his body but his body itself . . . Now in the case
of a person's body, its marks and traits, itself is the main evidence; . . ."
8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, 3rd Edition, Page 375. Wigmore also says
that requiring a defendant ". . . to speak words for identification of his
voice is no more than requiring a revelation of a physical mark." 4
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, 2nd Edition, Section 2265, Page 878. It would
appear, from this latter statement added to the preceding one, that no
problem would arise, at least on the face of it, in an issue such as the
one before us. Mere compulsion would not of itself bring one within the
privilege, because to invoke the privilege one must show testimonial compulsion and as the compulsory revelation of a physical mark is not testimonial compulsion, Holt v. U. S., 218 U. S. 245,252 (1910), it would
follow that compulsory statements made for purpose of voice identification would be proper. It is obvious that had the witness identified the
voice of the accused from overhearing spontaneous conversation no
question of testimonial compulsion would be presented and the court re-
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fused to pass on the question whether the privilege would have! been
violated had the accused merely been required to "talk"! without specifying the "words." Some courts have found the privilege violated based
upon the non-existence of the evidence prior to the compelled acts of- the
accused. In Beltran v. Sampson, 53 Ph. Is. 571, an attempt was made to
analogize the compulsory submission to bodily examination with the
compelling of the accused to submit a Sample of his handwriting. The
court there said: "In reality she (the appellant who was forced to submit
to bodily examination) was not compelled to execute any positive acts,
much legs a testimonial act; . .. all of which is very different from
what'is required of the petitioner in the present case where it is sought
to compel him to perform a positive testimonial act; to write and give
a specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of comparison. Besides,
in the case of Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. Is. 62, it was sought to exhibit something already in existence (bodily examination), while in the
case at bar the question deals with something not yet in existence, and
it is precisely sought to compel the petitioner to make, prepare, or
produce by his means, evidence not yet in existence; in short, to create
evidence which may seriously incriminate him." In Beachum v. State, 144
Tex. Crim. Report 272, 162 S. W. 2d 706, 809 (1942), noted in 21 Tex.
I R. 816, forced re-enactment of the crime by way of compulsory utterances was held violative of the privilege. Some courts have hield evidence
obtained by compulsion inadmissible on the erroneous theory of an
involuntary confession. In State v. Watson, 49 A. 2d 174 (Vt. 1946),
officers took the accused's finger prints without his consent. The
defendant's counsel suce.eeded in persuading the court that the compulsory taking of a person's finger prints was analogous to and should
be governed by the rules relating to confessions. This made it necessary
for the court to find that the "confession" (i.e., the finger prints) was
given voluntarily. A similar result was reached in Beachum v. State,
supra, where the accused was compelled to repeat words which the perpetrator of a holdup used in commission of the crime. The court held that
this conipulsion was not only repugnant to the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination but also violated Article 727 of the Texas
Criminal Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides- "A confession of
an accused shall not be used against him if obtained while in jail or
in custody unless In writing and after proper warning."
The original purpose of the protection from testimonial compulsion was
!d... to -force prosecuting officers to go out and search to obtain all the
available extrinsic evidence of an affense without relying upon the accused's admissions." However, decisions such as the principal case seem
to extend the privilege of self-incrimination beyond the original purpose,
thus excluding evidence that the witness was compelled to furnish, in or
out of court, which tends to reveal his criminal connection with the
offense where it is an integral part of the proof of guilt. Dunagan V.
State, 102 Tex. Crim. App. 404, 278 S. W. 432 (1925); Douglas v. State,
99 Tex. Crim. App. 413, 269 S. W. 1041 (1925).
NORMAN

B. JENSON

SECOND YEAR LAW STUDENT

CASE NOTES
WILLS CONSTRUCTION IMPLIED DISPOSITION INCORPORATION OF
EXTRINSIC DOCUMENTS BY REFERENCE CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVEY OF
TESTAMENTARY DEEDS. -. Decedent drew a holographic will which was

admitted to probate and which read in part: "For land described here in
being ... (description) .. . of Grant County, N Dak. I have prepared a
Deed to my nephew one Carl Glavkee of ...
Said Deed I wish my executrix to hand to Carl Glavkee after I am death." The deed, properly executed several months previous to the execution of the will, was retained
by the decedent and kept with the will where it was found at his death.
The County Court ordered that the deed be probated as a part of the
will. On appeal to the District Court, the decree of distribution was
affirmed on the theory of incorporation of the deed by reference. On
appeal to the Supreme Court it was hel, that the judgment be affirmed.
The latter court based its affirmance of the decree of distribution upon
the theory of a gift by implication, not upon the theory of incorporation
of the deed. In re Glavkee's Estate, 34 N. W. 2d 300 (N. D. 1948).
Some courts have found a delivery of deeds which were retained by
the grantor or placed in escrow to be effective on his death, saying that
the grantor has the fee subject to a limitation taking effect at his
death. Stone v. Duvall, 77 II. 475 i(1875). Other Courts say that the
title passes immediately with enjoyment postponed. Smith v. Smith, 173
Col. 725, 161 P. 495 (1916). Since physical transfer of possession of the
deed is not necessary to delivery but is merely evidence of intent to
deliver under some views, such a conclusion as that drawn by these
courts is entirely sound. 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd Ed. 1939) Sec.
1046, 1033, 1034; N. D. Rev. Code (1943) see. 47-0909. The theory is
supported in the case of Payne v. Payne, 128 Va. 33, 104 S. E. 712 (1920),
where the court said that the testator's statement in the will that he had
deeded property to a person indicated was cogent evidence of delivery.
Contra; Lange v. Cullinan, 205 Ill. 365, 68 N. E. 934 (1903); Allenback
v. Ridenour, 51 Nev. 437, 279 P. 32 (1929), But most cases support the
view that the deed must pass beyond the control of the grantor before
there is effective delivery. Merck v. Merck, 83 S. C. 329, 65 S. E. 347
(1909); Hayes v. Moffat, 83 Mont. 214, 271 P. 433 (1928); Orris v.
Whipple, 224 Ia. 1157, 280 N. W. 617 (1938). Yet, another case was
found which stated that the possession of the deed by the grantor at
his death merely negatived delivery and permitted the grantee to show
actual or constructive delivery if possible. Plowden v. Plowden, 52 Ga.
App. 741, 184 S. E. 343 (1935).
Courts generally have not given effect to erroneous recitals as to the
legal effect of collateral instruments in wills either by way of incorporation by reference or by the method of an implied gift as was done in
the instant case. Aside from the problem of incorporation of printed
deeds into holographic wills, the incorporation of undelivered deeds
has been denied to guard against fraud and to prevent giving dispositive
effect to some document which the testator did not intend to govern
disposition of his estate, unless such a document meets the three essentials of incorporatibn set out in the case of Ne-vton v. Seaman's"
Friend Society, 130 Mass. 91, 39 Am. Rep. .433 (1881), and followed by
Bottrell v. Spengler, 343 Ill. 476, 175 N. E. 781 (1931). They are, (1)
that the will identify the document, (2) that the document be in exist-
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ence at the time the will is drawn, and, (3) that the testator intend the
document to be given effect as part of the will. However, in an effort
to prevent intestacy as to part of an estate, the Supreme Court of Nebraska recently permitted incorporation of a deed whiclf had never
been delivered though the will expressly stated that the contestant was
not included in the will because the testator had previously conveyed
land to her by deed. In re Dimmitt's Estate, 141 Neb. 413, 3 N. W. 2d
752 (1942). This result was highly approved by Professor Homer
Carey who asked "What does it matter that he has evidenced this intention by reference to the act of having "deeded" the property rather
than to the deed itself. Does this departure in form from the rules of
incorporation strike at the safeguards?" Carey, Effect of Erroneous
Recital in Will of Conveyance, 37 Ill. L. R. 426 (1943); see also In re
Hogue's Will, 135 Pa. Super. 543, 6 A. 2d 108 (1939). Contra: Witham
v. Witham, 156 Ore. 59, 66 P. 2d. 281, 110 A. L. IL 253 (1937); Noble v.
Tipton, 219 Ill. 182, 76 N. E. 151, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 645 (1905); Brooker
v. Brooker, 130 Tex. 27, 106 S. W. 2d 247 (1937). But see: In re Watt's
Estate, 117 Mont. -505, 160 P. 2d 492 (1945) which criticises the Dimnnitt
Case saying that the Nebraska Court used a non-testamentary writing to effect an intent contradicted by the will itself.
The refusal to give effect to an erroneous recital of a previous conveyance in a will by construing it as an implied gift is likewise based
on the theory that if the testator attempted to dispose of his property
by non-testamentary means, he cannot have intended that such property
pass under the will and that therefore the property should be distributed according to the dictates of statute. Brooker v. Brooker, supra.
An instrument not complying with the requirements for testamentary
documents, and not incorporated by reference into the will, should not
be imported into and considered as-part of the will. In re ath's Estate,
10 Cal. 2d. 399, 75 P. 2d. 509, 115 A. L. R. 836 (1938). Where a testator
erroneously recites that he has previously disposed of property or directs delivery of a deed, such a recital is merely an incorrect description
of the effect of an instrument extrinsic to the will and may not operate as
a gift by implication. Noble v. Tipton, supra; Witham v. Witham, supra;
Hunt ez tel Streatorv. Evans, 134 Ill. 496, 25 N. E. 579 (1890). But see:
In re Dimmitt's Estate, supra; In re Hogue's Will, supra; Arrington v.
Browne, 235 Ala. 196, 178 So. 218 (1938). Surrounding circumstances
cannot be resorted to for the purpose of importing into the will, any
intention which is not there expressed. Bingel v. Volz, 142, 31 N. E. 18,
16, L..Ii.A. 321 (1892) ; Calloway v. Calloway, 171 Ky. 366, 188 S. W. 410
L. R. A. 1917A 1210 (1916). But see: Jennings v. Reeson, 200 Mich. 559,
166 N. W. 931 (1918). The instant ease is one of the first impression in
the jurisdiction. It reaches a result which gives effect to the testator's
undoubted purpose and yet allows the safeguards attached to the making of wills to be maintained.
W. M. Knsy
SEcoND YEAR LAw STUDENT

